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RICHARD  N.  COOPER 
Yale University 
TlE  adjustment  process  used to be de- 
scribed  in  theoretical  literature  in 
terms  of  an  automatic  mechanism.  This 
automaticity  is  largely  (but  not  wholly) 
absent today, and discussion of this issue is 
better framed in terms of (1) when national 
policy  makers  should  take  measures  to 
eliminate imbalances;  (2) what measures  are 
most appropriate and under what circum- 
stances; and  (3)  what  the  division of  re- 
sponsibility should be among countries, for 
when there are any imbalances there must 
be at least two. 
The first of these questions, when nation- 
al policy makers should take measures to 
eliminate imbalances, is not usually asked 
explicitly,  although  it  arises  frequently 
enough in  practice. It  is  not  self-evident 
that imbalances always ought to be elimi- 
nated  as quickly as possible; on  the  con- 
trary, there will be many occasions in which 
rapid adjustment is costly to surplus  or defi- 
cit country, and the best course of action is 
compensatory finance from surplus to defi- 
cit  country.  The  lending facilities  of  the 
IMF  offer one source of such finance; and 
national reserves can be used for the same 
purpose. Emminger points to the practical 
difficulties of making a correct assessment. 
If it is decided that an imbalance should 
be eliminated, a variety of measures are at 
hand, none of them satisfactory as devices 
for general use in all cases. If changes in ex- 
change rates are to be avoided, they come 
down basically  to  reductions in  domestic 
demand (or increases by  countries in sur- 
plus), restrictions on international transac- 
tions (or removal of restrictions  by countries 
in  surplus), and  exhortations or  stronger 
measures to improve the competitiveness of 
a country's products in world markets. 
Both  Scitovsky and Emminger turn to 
interregional  payments adjustment within a 
country for enlightenment on how the proc- 
ess might work smoothly, effortlessly, and, 
it would seem, painlessly. In search of the 
solution to this riddle, Scitovsky focuses on 
the ready acceptability of regional financial 
assets in the national capital market. So long 
as  a  region holds such assets-indeed,  so 
long as its  credit is  good-the  region can 
finance its deficit by sale of financial claims. 
It  would seem to  avoid  the  hard  choice 
among alternatives mentioned above. 
In fact, interregional  adjustment even in 
a  country with  a  well-developed national 
capital market probably involves far more 
pain than Scitovsky's analysis implies, and 
in particular  it involves substantial deflation 
in  deficit regions, substantial  inflation in 
surplus regions. "Depressed areas" are  a 
familiar  phenomenon  in  most  countries. 
This term is itself ambiguous. Sometimes it 
means simply an area which is backward  by 
modern standards. But  more often it  also 
means an area in which average incomes are 
low in part because workers and plant are 
idle or only partially employed. Whenever 
such areas have higher than average unem- 
ployment levels, depression is a manifesta- 
tion of an ex ante regional balance-of-pay- 
ments  deficit  at  full  employment.  De- 
pressed incomes and employment prevent 
the deficit from materializing.  Sales of assets 
outside the region merely help to  cushion 
the fall in economic activity; and if it per- 
sists,  the  movement of  capital may  even 
become perverse, capital moving out of the 
region and inducing further depression. 
On the other hand, surplus areas experi- 
ence expansion  which spills rapidly over into 
imports from other regions. This expansion 
will result in an "inflation"  of factor incomes 
and other local costs even if price increases 
are limited by stiff import competition. 
Why is this reliance on Keynesian income 
adjustments tolerated by  regions within a 
country but not between countries? There 
are, I think, three reasons: 
1. There  is  the  absence of  perception. 
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Residents of a region typically do not think 
in terms of macroeconomic  policy for their 
region.  They  cannot  control  their  own 
money supply, and the possibilities  for effec- 
tive fiscal policy within the region are limit- 
ed by the region's ability to borrow  outside. 
The  limited  possibilities for  pursuing re- 
gional stabilization  policy limit the demands 
for action. 
2. Deflation within a region is cushioned 
by transfers  from the national government, 
as both Scitovsky and Emminger  point out. 
Some of these are automatic. Regional tax 
payments linked to  income decline as in- 
comes  decline,  whereas, in  contrast,  na- 
tional  expenditure within  the  region pre- 
sumably will not decline and may actually 
increase in the form of unemployment com- 
pensation,  relief payments,  and  the  like. 
Furthermore,  national  governments  in- 
creasingly pursue deliberate regional poli- 
cies, designed to stimulate activity  within 
depressed regions through direct  govern- 
ment expenditures,  tax incentives to outside 
investment, and so on. On both counts the 
depressed region receives outside financing 
which helps prevent incomes from falling to 
the full extent required for elimination of 
the ex ante deficit. 
3.  Factor  mobility  from  the  region to 
other parts of the country will help cushion 
the welfare impact of regional deflation on 
the mobile factors. These factors can limit 
their losses by  moving elsewhere. This  is 
most  true, of  course, for financial capital, 
but  it  is also true for the young  and the 
skilled members  of the labor force. This fact 
of mobility, incidentally, reduces interest in 
the region by some of its potentially most 
articulate members. 
Emminger adds one  further important 
point, namely, that the very absence of in- 
dependent regional monetary policy  is  a 
factor favorable to maintaining interregion- 
al equilibrium.  This is unquestionably true, 
but it is only the obverse of what has been 
said above; regions cannot readily and do 
not  typically pursue regional stabilization 
policies, but  rather suffer the deflation or 
inflation required to  restore and preserve 
balance. In short, they tolerate and accept 
a state of affairs which is not accepted by 
nations. 
Let us return to the international case in 
which  the  participants  typically  manage 
their economies with an eye to overall do- 
mestic macroeconomic  objectives as well as 
to international balance. Emminger points 
out that the cure  for international  imbalance 
must typically be related to its cause or di- 
agnosis. He gives the example of overexpan- 
sion of domestic demand, which can lead 
both to an excess demand reflected  in abnor- 
mally high imports and, with time, to a de- 
terioration in  the  cost-competitiveness of 
the  country's  products  at  home  and  in 
world markets. There is a crucial difference 
between a deficit which can be eliminated 
simply by  reducing domestic expenditures 
and one where costs have gotten so far out 
of line that some internal or external change 
in the country's price level will ultimately be 
required. 
While Emminger is right in some sense, 
and his illustration is apt, I would prefer to 
formulate this question differently. In logic 
the cause is irrelevant to the proper  remedy. 
The appropriate cure for international im- 
balance should be related not to the cause 
of  the  imbalance but  to  deviations from 
other policy targets (in the sense in which 
Tinbergen [1952] has used this term). Very 
often the "cause" of an imbalance will be 
reflected in  deviations  from  other  policy 
targets, and, hence, in these cases the cause 
should affect the  cure. But  there will  be 
many  cases  in  which  the  cause  and  the 
appropriate cure  are  unrelated.  Here  a 
choice must be made among national objec- 
tives. Policies to restore overall imbalance 
should be selected on the basis of a national 
(and international) cost-benefit calculation, 
not on the basis of the cause. 
One of the key practical problems of an 
effective adjustment process is how to get 
surplus countries to  adjust.  I  only  half- 
facetiously suggest that  this is even more 
difficult than getting reserve currency  coun- 
tries to adjust. Under the gold standard sys- 
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in deficit experienced a deflation of mone- 
tary demand, but countries in surplus had 
an automatic inflation of monetary demand. 
These days  that  process has  been largely 
broken on both sides (although in the past 
few  years  some  surplus  countries  have 
acquiesced in some inflation). Deficit coun- 
tries  can  ultimately  be  forced to  adjust, 
since  they  will  run  out  of  reserves and 
financing can be withheld from them. No 
such sanction exists for surplus countries. 
France, for example, had a surplus for the 
seven  years  1959-65,  a  surplus  roughly 
twice as large in terms of GNP as the U.S. 
deficit. Germany's  surplus lasted more than 
a decade, although it became  more moderate 
in 1961-65, and in 1965 Germany even ran 
a deficit. Italy had a truly enormous  surplus 
for the three years 1964-66, a surplus due 
in large part to deficient demand in the do- 
mestic  economy.  Stimulation  of  demand 
would not only reduce idle resources there 
but  would also work toward external bal- 
ance. Yet  Italy  received far less pressure 
to reduce this large surplus from its Com- 
mon  Market partners and others than it 
received to reduce its deficit in 1963 or than 
the United Kingdom and the United States 
received to reduce their deficits. This is true 
in spite of the fact that the surplus of Italy, 
relative  to  its  trade and  to  its  domestic 
economy, was far larger than the deficits of 
either Britain or the United States; and it 
exceeded the large British deficit of 1964  in 
absolute size. 
Ideally, responsibility for adjustment be- 
tween deficit and surplus countries should 
be divided according to some world welfare 
criteria, but we have no such criteria. In- 
deed, there has been no serious explicit dis- 
cussion of  them in official circles. I  might 
make some partial remarks  on that question, 
however, particularly  in light of Emminger's 
assertion that  during the  last  five  or  six 
years the burden of adjustment has fallen 
very  one-sidedly on the surplus countries. 
This assertion raises both a factual question 
and an analytical one. Many private U.S. 
firms and government agencies would cer- 
tainly be surprised to learn that they have 
borne very little burden as a result of the 
U.S. balance-of-payments program. But at 
a more general level, the United States did 
take  deflationary measures in  the  severe 
budget of 1959, largely as a result of bal- 
ance-of-payments considerations.  The Ken- 
nedy  administration was  basically out  of 
sympathy with that approach, but it none- 
theless refrained  from reflating as rapidly as 
might have been possible. Balance-of-pay- 
ments considerations-and  public attitudes 
toward "gold losses"-played  a major role 
in the caution with which the administration 
moved toward more aggressive  economic ex- 
pansion. As a result, the United States lost 
more than $150 billion worth of output dur- 
ing this period, a loss that exceeds by 50 per 
cent the entire annual output of Germany, 
which is the second largest economy in the 
non-Communist  world. 
The  analytical  question concerns what 
exactly  we  mean  by  "burden of  adjust- 
ment." Many Europeans feel very strongly 
about inflation; and inflation is politically 
important for that reason alone. But that is 
not the same as saying inflation was or is a 
great "burden"  in economic terms. The bur- 
den of creeping  inflation is yet to be demon- 
strated  in  analytical  terms,'  and  indeed 
there are those who even go so far as  to 
argue that moderate inflation is beneficial, 
not detrimental. Even if we leave that argu- 
ment to one side, it is particularly  question- 
able whether recent inflation in Europe has 
been a great burden, since much of the up- 
ward adjustment in costs there has not been 
reflected  in higher  prices.2  Past savings have 
1 Tibor and Anne  Scitovsky  (1964)  have  exam- 
ined  the  possible  costs  of creeping inflation in  the 
United  States  and  conclude  it  is  very  small  com- 
pared with the costs of underemployment. 
2 I dismiss the steady  but moderate increases in 
consumer price indexes for this  purpose. These  in- 
dexes  do  not  reflect  improvements  in quality  and 
they  contain a heavy  component  of wages, so they 
naturally increase as real economic growth proceeds, 
leading  to  higher factor  incomes.  Japan  offers the 
outstanding  illustration,  with  its  steady  improve- 
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not  been  arbitrarily appropriated to  any 
great extent through  inflation. Rather, infla- 
tion has shifted the distribution of income. 
This obviously represents  a cost to some seg- 
ments of society, but it is a benefit to others; 
and without some explicit judgment about 
who should get what it  is difficult to say 
whether  European  countries  have  been 
made worse off or better off as a result of 
their experience during the last five years. 
In contrast to inflation, unemployment im- 
poses  a  heavy  cost  on  some segments of 
society  with  no  corresponding benefits to 
others. Whatever economic cost one might 
attribute to European inflation, it certainly 
cannot come close to the lost output in the 
United States. 
Regardless of  the  outcome of  this  cost 
comparison, we are not likely to get inter- 
nationally the same kind of payments ad- 
justment which we now have interregionally 
within each country. This is in part because 
industrial nations are simply unwilling to 
tolerate the  same level  of  inflation or of 
unemployment and idle resources  which re- 
gions within a country are willing to toler- 
ate. It  is in part because no large stock of 
universally acceptable financial assets exists 
to  be passed around from one country to 
another, and residents of surplus countries 
are either unable or unwilling to lend exten- 
sively  to  deficit countries through private 
channels. Most  countries, indeed, are not 
willing to give up monetary policy as an in- 
strument of domestic policy, a necessity if 
international lending  is  to  be  the  main 
source of "adjustment." And it  is in part 
because governments of  surplus countries 
are not willing to offer the same long-term 
finance-even  grants-to  deficit  countries 
that  surplus regions within a  country are 
willing to grant to deficit regions within a 
country. A New Yorker can identify to some 
extent-even  here it has often been difficult 
panied by increases in the  "cost of living"  of more 
than  5 per  cent  per annum  since  1960.  European 
commodity  prices have  risen far less  than  the  rise 
in unit labor costs, and in some cases have fallen. 
-with  the plight  of the West Virginian.  The 
Welshman  or Breton  or Sicilian  is  just  too 
remote  to call forth  any substantial  finance 
of a long-term  character.3 
Under  these  circumstances,  and  so  long 
as we desire  to maintain  the  existing  struc- 
ture  of  exchange  rates,  we  must  recognize 
that  restrictions4 on international  payments 
will  become  more  common  and,  indeed,  an 
essential  feature  of  the  adjustment  process. 
For  most  countries  restrictions  are far  less 
costly  in  terms  of lost  output  than  is defla- 
tion,  resulting  as  the  latter  does  in  idle 
capacity  and  unacceptable  levels  of  unem- 
ployment.  (It  is  not  clear  whether  restric- 
tions  are  more  or  less  costly  in  economic 
terms  than  is  inflation.)  If  we  are  to  rely 
more  heavily  on  restrictions-Emminger 
suggests  the  need  for restrictions  on capital 
account,  but  they  might  also have  to be ex- 
tended  to  current  account  we  should 
search for ways  to minimize  the  adverse  ef- 
fects  of such restrictions  and to confine their 
motivation  and  use  as much  as possible  to 
requirements  of  the  balance  of  payments. 
What  forms are least  damaging  to efficiency 
and to the freedom of international  transac- 
tions?  And  how  can  the  use  of such  restric- 
tions  be  kept  within  acceptable  bounds? 
Answers  to the first question  may  vary from 
country  to  country.  (For  a given  improve- 
ment  in  the  balance  of  payments,  restric- 
tions  probably  do  more  damage  to  a  rela- 
tively  open  economy  than  to  a  relatively 
closed one.)  They  should have  to be justified 
on balance  of payments  grounds and should 
require some form of international  approval 
to  avoid  self-defeating  retaliation.  And,  as 
Emminger  says,  it  is  far  preferable  where 
possible  to  avoid  restrictions  by  the  deficit 
countries  altogether  by  having  the  surplus 
countries  liberalize  their  payments  instead. 
3 The  Marshall Plan  was an outstanding  excep- 
tion, and recently within the EEC some lending to 
depressed areas has taken place through the  Euro- 
pean Investment  Bank. 
I Defined to include tax measures and even  vol- 
untary  restraint  programs, not  merely  direct  con- 
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COMMENT: THE  OBLIGATIONS OF SURPLUS  COUNTRIES 
RAYMOND  F.  MIKESELL 
University  of Oregon 
UNDER  conditions  which  have prevailed 
over the last several years in which a 
principal reserve  currency  country is in con- 
tinual deficit while several non-reserve  cur- 
rency countries have experienced  what they 
regard as unwanted surpluses,  what are the 
obligations of the surplus countries in the 
balance of payments adjustment process?  In 
considering this question, it  should be ob- 
served that non-reserve currency countries 
have certain options which are not available 
to the United States if it is to properly exer- 
cise its function as world banker. For ex- 
ample,  the  United  States  cannot devalue 
without an almost simultaneous  adjustment 
of the gold parities in most of the countries 
of the world. It cannot or should not impose 
capital controls which impair its operation 
as world banker, and it  has an obligation 
not only to its domestic economy but to the 
rest of the world not to deliberately deflate 
at the cost of substantial unemployment, a 
lower rate of growth, or a sharp diminution 
or cessation of capital exports. The  latter 
point  is  particlarly important, since  the 
United States has an obligation not just to 
the handful of surplus countries that do not 
want additional reserves  but to the majority 
of  the  countries of  the  world not  in  this 
favored position. Deflationary action  and 
reducing  capital  exports  by  the  United 
States  would impair the  ability  of  deficit 
countries to  adjust  their balance without 
reducing  output. 
The fact that non-reserve  currency  coun- 
tries have a wide range of options whether 
in surplus  or deficit does seem to impose cer- 
tain obligations upon them in the adjust- 
ment process.  They are after all beneficiaries 
of an orderly international financial system 
which can only be maintained through co- 
operative action. First of all, surplus coun- 
tries have  an  obligation to  co-operate in 
freeing international trade and to  remove 
their restrictions  on capital exports. Certain 
large surplus countries, including France, 
continue to  maintain  capital  export con- 
trols. Surplus countries also have an obliga- 
tion to maintain a mix of monetary and fis- 
cal policies which will discourage  large capi- 
tal imports and perhaps encourage capital 
outflow. Finally, if  these measures do not 
suffice in  eliminating unwanted surpluses, 
they have the option of currency apprecia- 
tion. They also have the option of control- 
ling capital imports, but this would appear 
to be a second-best solution. 
While there are certain costs associated 
with currency  appreciation,  appreciation  on 
the part of a few reluctant surplus countries 
is easier than having the United States to- 
gether with most of the rest of the world de- 
preciate vis-a-vis the surplus countries. De- 
preciation is almost inevitably inflationary 
since it is virtually impossible to balance in- 
creases in prices of international goods with 
decreases in prices of domestic goods with- 
out  sacrificing employment  and  output. 